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Abstract: Nowadays, many authors claim to belong to the critical theory tradition although their 
research focuses on a heterogeneity of topics and not all of them refer to the Frankfurt School. Within 
this debate, this paper shows how relations of domination could be considered the main object of 
investigation of critical theory. This could help us not only to delineate its methodology, but also, and 
mainly, to provide a compelling answer to some objections critical theory seems to face. Last but not 
least, it could additionally show that this object is strictly related to a certain idea of social justice. In 
this way, critical theory could remain consistent with its immanent or reconstructive methodology, 
and, in the same way, it could be better grounded in its emancipatory intention, thus avoiding falling 
into relativism. Obviously, we are aware that the critical theory tradition is concerned with a huge 
number of issues. It focuses on highly differentiated social phenomena, addressing its criticism to 
capitalism, ideologies, unjust socio-economic distribution, a certain idea of individual freedom, ways 
of conceiving identity, and many others. This paper, however, argues that it is possible to view how 
critical theory tackles all these topics from the same essential perspective: it criticizes eminently the 
relations of domination that these social phenomena reproduce. Moreover, by considering relations 
of domination as critical theory’s main object of investigation, we can draw a particular grammar of 
justice which is imminently relational or intersubjective.  
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1. Critical theory and relations of domination 
 
Nowadays, many authors claim to belong to the critical theory tradition although 
their research focuses on a heterogeneity of topics and not all of them refer to the Frankfurt 
School. For this reason, numerous works2 have recently flourished containing as their central 
issue the methodology adopted by authors who consider themselves critical theorists in order 
to stress the fundamental features of investigation they share, and, in doing so, define the 
specific methodology that should characterize critical theory. From an initial insight, we can 
assert that critical theory’s main area of interest is social criticism, but this appears to be too 
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general and vague, mostly because not all social criticism adopts the perspective of critical 
theory.  
This paper, then, attempts to show that relations of domination could instead be 
considered critical theory’s main object of investigation. This could help us not only to 
delineate the methodology of critical theory but also, and mainly, to provide a compelling 
answer to some objections it seems to face. Last but not least, it could additionally show that 
this object is strictly related to a certain idea of social justice. 
One of the most important advantages of this approach might be to overcome a 
classic controversy in political and social philosophy concerning two different, and 
apparently irreconcilable, perspectives faced by social and political theorists. In the first 
perspective “the task is to discover or invent an ‘ideal theory’ employing the method of 
rational construction, and then to ask how the resulting abstract moral principles can be 
‘implemented’ in practice.”3 In the second perspective, instead, “one should start from the 
reality of concrete political contexts, reject normative cloud cuckoo conceptions and confine 
oneself to what is possible and acceptable here and now in view of deep-seated interest 
conflicts.”4 This paper sustains that critical theory is able to avoid this fruitless opposition; 
we can, though, obtain this result only if we are able to reject the two main objections 
presented against critical theorists’ methodology, that is, immanent or reconstructive critique. 
The first objection concerns a presupposed lack of autonomy where the normative status of 
critical theory necessarily depends on the normative standards it aims to criticize but that it 
is not able to generate autonomously.5 The second objection regards the intention of critical 
theory to offer not only a simple critique of the state of things, but, above all, a critique which 
is able to stimulate changes and transformations. This objection holds that even if critical 
theory effectively offers a transformative critique, it is not able to guarantee, or even point 
out or suggest, that these transformations and changes would be emancipatory and that they 
would really represent an improvement.6 
This paper suggests that it is possible to reject these two important objections by 
considering relations of domination as the main object of critical theory. Obviously, we are 
aware that the critical theory tradition is concerned with a huge number of issues. It focuses 
on highly differentiated social phenomena, addressing its criticism to capitalism, ideologies, 
unjust socio-economic distribution, a certain idea of individual freedom, ways of conceiving 
identity, and many others; and in all these cases it proceeds to highlight internal and necessary 
contradictions. This paper, however, argues that it is possible to notice how critical theory 
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tackles all these topics from the same essential perspective: it criticizes eminently the relations 
of domination that these social phenomena reproduce.  
This way of considering relations of domination as the main object of investigation 
of critical theory draws a particular grammar of justice which is imminently relational or 
intersubjective. This means that a critical theory of justice focuses primarily on unjustifiable 
social relations, whether political or economic. In other words: “all those relations, in more 
or less institutionalized form, that fall short of the standard of reciprocal and general 
justifiability and are marked by forms of exclusion or domination.”7 This gives rise to some 
important consequences concerning questions of distributive justice and power. 
 
2. The immanent/reconstructive critique and the active role of the actors 
 
Even if it is true that the immanent critique or reconstructive critique is its own 
methodology of critical theory, this methodology can assume different specifications that 
focus more on some aspects than others. For instance, in the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School the points of view of the actors was generally underestimated and they embraced 
instead the concept of alienation; contrarily, the last generation of critical theorists pays 
particular attention to actors’s points of view but in some cases has appeared to lose its 
emancipatory intention – a central element in the critical theory tradition – for example in 
terms of eradicating social suffering.8 However, what is clear enough in recent developments 
in critical theory is its efforts to avoid paternalism in any form. This means not only avoiding 
the adoption of ‘external’ normative principles, but also taking into serious consideration the 
points of view of the victims of injustice or domination. Therefore, critical theory must 
proceed following a methodology based on an immanent/reconstructive critique and on the 
active role of the actors. 
According to Stahl, “traditionally, an immanent critique is a form of social critique 
which derives the standards it employs from the object criticized, that is, the society in 
question, rather than approaching the society with independently justified standards.”9 But 
this can only be a starting point in precisely defining an immanent critique in the sense 
understood by critical theory. What appears immediately evident is that we can realize 
different forms of social critique depending on the way we assume the relevant standard. 
Cooke,10 for instance, identifies four broad positions which can be characterized as critical 
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social theory: conventionalist, radically contextualist, context-transcending, and 
authoritarian. We can define the first and the last respectively as internal and external social 
critique; both of them, however, present some important shortcomings. Precisely, an external 
critique (authoritarian) seems problematic in terms of justificatory power because it claims 
too much regarding the force of objective moral truths, while a strong internal critique 
(conventionalist) seems problematic in terms of transformative potential because a mere 
demand for consistency and accord concerning the self-understanding of the members and 
their concrete behaviors seems only to permit a very weak form of critique. For this reason, 
Ferrara11 sustains that only the two remaining versions of social critique are compatible with 
an immanent critique, that is, the radically contextualist and the context-transcending. The 
former 
appeals to normative ideas implicit but not fully realized within a given 
sociocultural context. The changes in question are deemed changes for the 
better because they bring us closer to how things would be, if only we were 
able to realize our own deepest hopes and aspirations.12 
 
While the latter 
 
appeals to normative ideas that are at once immanent to the sociocultural 
context in question and transcend it. As in the case of the second position, 
the ideas appealed to are context immanent in the sense that they are implicit 
within a particular sociocultural context, although, […] in contrast to the 
second position, they are not merely expressions of our deepest hopes and 
aspirations (although they are that too); they represent hopes and aspirations 
that everyone, everywhere should have if they are to be able to fulfill their 
potentials as human beings.13 
 
Ferrara locates some exemplary authors of the critical theory orientation, such as 
Walzer and Rorty, within the radical contextualist version of social critique, and others, such 
as Habermas and Honneth, within the context-transcending one. Now, we can observe that 
both versions of social critique adopt a position that is consistent with the origins of 
immanent critique, which we can track down in the Hegelian, Marxist, and Frankfurt School 
traditions. In fact, according to them, an immanent critique is supposed to be a strategy that 
not only proceeds from the actual social practice of a society, but also that attempts to go 
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beyond a mere reproduction of the normative commitments of its members on the level of 
theory; in other words, it intends to stimulate a transformation. Therefore, we can agree that 
Stahl’s specific interpretation of immanent critique fits well with these intentions and coheres 
with both radically contextualist and context-transcending versions of social critique. Thus, 
according to him, immanent critique: 
 
is a form of social critique that evaluates both the empirical behavior 
constituting social practices and the explicit self-understanding of their 
members according to standards that are, in some sense, internal to those 
practices themselves. By doing so, immanent critique aims at a 
transformation of such practices that encompasses both actions and self-
understandings.14 
 
This definition of immanent critique is very close to the concept of 
“reconstruction”.15 Indeed, a reconstructive critique “claims to present rules, structures, 
evaluative criteria, and social processes in which symbolic objects emerge and gain social 
meaning; and, at the same time, they are rules, structures, and processes that show potentials 
for emancipation.”16 
Jaeggi17, also, in her attempt to redefine and actualize the critique of ideology 
understood as a critique of domination, offers a similar interpretation of immanent critique, 
which stresses, above all, its internal standards and its potential in terms of the transformation 
of norms and social practices. She identifies five main features that distinguish immanent 
critique. First, immanent critique starts from norms that are inherent to a given social 
situation. These norms are grounded rationally, and they are constitutive to some determinate 
social practices and to their institutional setting. Second, immanent critique takes into 
account the relationship between norms and reality, which it criticizes as inverted or 
equivocal in itself, rather than as dissolved or weakened. In other words, the norms in 
question are effective but, as effective, they become contradictory. This means that the 
relationship between norms and reality is both false and necessary at the same time. Third, 
immanent critique focuses on the internal contradictions of reality and on the norms that 
constitute it. This kind of contradiction is not casual; rather, it is necessary and compulsory. 
In other words, there are inevitable reasons why norms and their respective practices and 
institutions cannot be realized without contradictions. Fourth, immanent critique is, then, 
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transformative. Its aim is not simply the reconstruction of the existent order, nor the 
restoration of a functional coincidence between norms and reality, but is to be guided by the 
need to construct a contradictory situation for something new. Last, immanent critique is 
simultaneously criticism of a practice based on norms or standards (whereby this practice 
does not match) and the critique of these standards themselves.18 She provides a classic 
example of this way of proceeding, namely, in the case of an immanent critique of bourgeois-
capitalist society. In this case, the contradictions between freedom and equality in natural law 
understanding and capitalistic social reality should lead not only to a transformation of 
economic and social organization, but also to a transformation of the concepts of freedom 
and equality themselves, for example, toward a positive conception of freedom and a more 
materialistic conception of equality. 
As we have seen, critical theory adopts a methodology that tends to exclude 
paternalism in any form, but this concern should be addressed not only to avoid any ‘external’ 
standards from which to investigate a particular society, but also in terms of attitudes 
regarding actors’s or participants’s points of view. Many critical theorists share the same 
opinion about the active role that actors or participants play in social critique, in particular 
since the introduction of Habermas’s paradigm.19 
The way in which a critical theorist faces the role of agents or participants in the 
social practice that is the object of her investigation has to do with an important dispute 
about the position the theorist must assume: of an observer or of a participant. In the former 
case, the observer position allows the critical theorist not to become trapped in the same 
ideological mechanisms that she intends to reveal and denounce; however, she may run the 
risk of disregarding the subjective motivations and convictions of the social actors, and at 
the same time she might distance herself from them, losing the concrete possibility to 
convince them through her critical investigation. On the other hand, the participant position 
makes it possible to avoid these kinds of problems; however, the critical theorist might not 
be able to maintain the necessary distance from the social praxis and its implicit normative 
criteria to provide a compelling critique.20 
Celikates sustains that it is possible to avoid this fruitless contraposition because even 
if the agents are not professional sociologists or philosophers they “do not only do and think 
what they are doing and thinking, but they are able to relate to what they and others are doing 
and thinking either critically or affirmatively.”21 This does not mean that they always reflect 
on and justify what they are doing; however, “they are in principle capable of doing so and 
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actually do so quite regularly in everyday situations of crisis and conflict.”22 In this way, one 
can sustain that agents are able to do this without believing in the agents’ capacity to be fully 
autonomous and self-transparent. 
In order to understand these everyday practices and fairly common capacities of 
justification and critique, Celikates suggests adopting some elements of theory from 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s work.23 They hold that the competencies and capacities of 
knowledgeable agents are not conceived as obscure mental faculties but instead as realized 
in the actual performances of the agents. Boltanski and Thèvenot identify six principles of 
worth operative in the different situations of everyday life: “On the basis of each of these 
principles, a form of common good can be exhibited that we called a polity or cite.”24 
According to them, “this model aims not only to account for the arguments deployed by 
people in the course of their disputes, but also for the means they employ to seek to leave 
the dispute behind them and re-establish agreement.”25 They call these means reality tests. It 
follows that we can therefore distinguish two general cases of critique. First, it can take as its 
object the way in which a test is conducted locally and show that its conduct did not respect 
established procedures. In the second case, the critique might become more radical; it can 
take the test with itself as its target, and therefore the very regime of justification applied to 
a situation is rejected. 
In this section, we have clarified what kind of methodology characterizes critical 
theory. It is mainly based on the central idea of an immanent critique which is able to evaluate 
effectively the norms and social practices of a society, take into due consideration the self-
understanding of the members of that society, and provide a critique with a high level of 
transformative potential. Now, as we have already stated in the introduction, it seems that 
inherently with this type of immanent critique two relevant objections arise. 
 
3. Two main objections to critical theory 
 
As we have said, the first objection concerns a presupposed lack of autonomy, where 
the normative status of critical theory necessarily depends on the normative standards it aims 
to criticize but that it is not able to generate autonomously. This has been identified by 
Habermas26 as a sort of normative deficit (in particular concerning the first generation of 
critical theory). Meanwhile, the second objection holds that even if critical theory effectively 
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offers a transformative critique, it is not able to guarantee, or even point out or suggest, that 
the transformations and changes would be emancipatory and that they really would represent 
an improvement. These two objections appear to be intimately linked to each other. In other 
words, we have to fill the gap of the potential normative deficit of critical theory in order to 
reject effectively not only the first objection but also the second one. This is clear when we 
come to evaluate Jaeggi’s27 and Stahl’s28 attempts to respond to these objections, which 
appear to be not very convincing, in particular in terms of the second objection.  
Jaeggi highlights a potential contradiction between the transformative intention 
involved in critical theory analyses and their intention to exclude a normative prescription 
about how something should be. In other words, critical theory does not ground norms or 
ideas (for example, norms such as freedom and equality), neither it adopts external or 
independent normative standards. It says nothing about the effective necessity for norms or 
ideas to be realized, nor whether they are good or bad, true or false in themselves. Here, in 
this apparent contradiction, we can see that the two objections are related. First, this kind of 
immanent critique seems to lack autonomy, it is not normatively relevant. Jaeggi offers an 
interesting solution to this first objection, but thisthat appears incomplete or impartial 
because it seems still to leave the second objection valid. 
According to Jaeggi, the process adopted by immanent critique should be considered 
“normatively significant”29. This normativity of the second order, as she calls it, can be 
inferred by the object of the critique itself. For example, in the case addressed by Jaeggi, the 
critique of ideology, we can observe how ideologies contain normative forces. By the mere 
fact of being worldviews that affect social reality, they define and limit the space of possibility 
for action, and therefore are normative prescriptions themselves. The same process could be 
valid not only for the critique of ideology, but also for all the social, cultural, and political 
aspects that maintain and reproduce the relations of domination that critical theorists 
investigate and criticize. This means that the critical analysis itself gains “an autonomous 
normative character and not just instrumental.”30 
Now, even if Jaeggi’s considerations may be quite sufficient to reject the first 
objection, it seems that the second objection still remains consistent. In fact, showing that 
the immanent critique conceived in such way is not a simple strategy for reconstructing a 
social reality or for implementing its normative potential coherently, but rather, that it 
addresses the transformation of social reality and its norms and ideas, does not mean that 
such transformative potential would move towards an emancipatory new situation or 
configuration. In the first insight, Jaeggi suggests proceeding by adopting a Hegelian variant 
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of immanent critique, namely the idea that “the correct is developed by overcoming the 
false.”31 By adopting the principle of Hegelian dialectic, Jaeggi conceives a critique that is, 
thus, determined and negative at the same time. Jaeggi is aware that even if she has 
reformulated the Hegelian dialectic in a pragmatic sense, excluding a teleological conception 
of history and its consequent deterministic process, the problem remains quite the same. The 
point is that without Hegel’s telos that indirectly determines and pulls his dialectical process 
in an emancipatory direction, we cannot have any guarantee of the paths it might take; 
emancipation is only one possibility among many others.  
Stahl is also aware of this difficulty. He provides an illuminating example: 
  
we can imagine a community that is committed to gender equality on the level 
of explicit belief. In terms of actual intersubjective reactions, however, 
women are not only treated badly in that community, bad behavior towards 
women is not negatively sanctioned. Such a community would have an 
immanent norm of discrimination despite having explicit norms of non-
discrimination. Certainly, when dealing with such a community, one would 
not argue that a critic is obligated to convince them to also explicitly endorse 
discrimination. This is a valid argument.32 
 
Stahl endorses a kind of solution which has the quality, at least, to define the theory 
of immanent critique in a pragmatic and modest sense, thus avoiding a naïve attitude or an 
excessively utopian pretension, and, above all, respecting the active role of social actors. In 
fact, he asserts that although a theory of immanent critique should not guarantee progress, 
and in this sense it is not a methodology to derive what society should like, its main 
contribution is to establish that, beyond the standards of external critique, there is often the 
potential for improvement contained within our practices and that there are “reasons to be 
hopeful about the possibility of social progress.”33 
Obviously, this kind of interpretation is acceptable. It seems, though, that 
emancipatory intention is an essential element of critical theory (not simply a hope), and that 
it should also be essential to its own reconstructive methodology. However, following the 
first generation of critical theorists, it has become impossible think of emancipation through 
the internal self-destructive tendency of capitalism. Since Habermas, this emancipatory 
intention has been thought to be inscribed in “the normative structures of modernity that 
have liberated the potential to produce an emancipated way of life, though this is effectively 
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only ever partially realized.”34 In this sense Habermas holds that “one of the fundamental 
understandings of 'critique' is the confrontation between the emancipatory potential present 
in deeply ingrained normative structures and its limited realization in social life.”35  Clearly, 
even if there are strong reasons to keep critical theory within Habermas’ theoretical 
framework, we have to keep carefully in mind a certain sociological deficit that some 
interpretations of his account of critical theory could imply.36 Honneth was one of the first 
authors to highlight this weakness in Habermas’ theory, but nonetheless Honneth does not 
discard the emancipatory intention in his critical theory approach, rather he mostly bases his 
conception on what he calls a realistic concept of emancipatory interest.37 
In light of this, by considering relations of domination as the main object of 
investigation of critical theory, it could be possible to better ground its normative status and, 
therefore, affirm more appropriately and vigorously its emancipatory intention while also 
remaining coherent within its own methodology based on immanent or reconstructive 
critique. 
It is, then, immediately necessary to provide a brief definition of the concept of 
domination. Here, domination concerns all kinds of processes that “strive to contain and 
limit critique, silence it, expel it.”38 According to Boltanski, “an effect of domination can 
therefore be characterized by its capacity to restrict, in more or less significant proportions, 
the field of critique”, and further, “in a situation of domination, the loops of reflexivity 
whereby circulation between confirmation and critique is established are broken.”39 In this 
way, relations of domination are concerned with specifically a way of justifying the current 
social praxis, and above all the manner in which the justifications of this social praxis are 
realized and upheld. Forst takes a similar position. According to him, “we speak of domination 
(Beherrschung) when the relations in question are asymmetrical, when they rest on a closure of 
the space of justification in favor of particular, non-justified legitimations which portray such 
an order as just or unalterable.”40 According to Forst, in this case the space of justifications 
may be ideologically sealed off or occupied by effective threats. In this regard, “having power 
means being able to use, influence, determine, occupy, or even close off the space of reasons 
and justifications of other subjects”41, and above all it acts in this way intentionally. 
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Such definition of domination has a significant consequence, namely it implies that 
we can understand persons “as social and at the same time autonomous beings”, therefore 
“they appear as active beings, not as passive entities to be acted upon, or as needy or suffering 
beings.”42 The premise that the justifications put forth by agents themselves and the way they 
engage in critiques in their life-world have to be taken seriously and are crucial in order to 
unmask domination.43 
Obviously, this interpretation is grounded in the idea that the “human being is an 
animal who can give reasons”44, or as Forst suggests, human beings are justificatory beings. 
In this sense, “they not only have the ability to justify or take responsibility for their beliefs 
and actions by giving reasons to others, but in certain contexts they see this as a duty and 
expect that others will do the same.”45 
In a certain way this conception of a person as holding a basic moral right to 
justification does not seem to be that different from Honneth’s46 conception of a person as 
a subject who claims recognition, or Fraser’s conception47, in which a person claims participatory 
parity. This seems to appeal as a very ‘minimal’, or at least inevitable, moral assumption about 
human beings that critical theory may accept in order to avoid falling into relativism, even 
without renouncing its intention to ground itself in an immanent perspective. Certainly, there 
is great difference among these theories, for example, between Forst’s and Honneth’s 
conceptions that are grounded respectively in a deontological and in a teleological or 
substantive premise. But what is relevant here is the existence of a moral or ethical 
assumption in their theories which seems to be based on a minimal and as uncontroversial 
as possible concept of autonomy/dignity and mutual recognition. However, from a critical 
theory perspective, is essential in all these theories, concepts like ‘principle of justification’, 
‘recognition’, or ‘participatory parity’, are results of historical reconstruction or reflection48, 
and, above all, they are the results of historical social conflicts.49 In this regard we can 
perfectly agree with Honneth when he sustains that critical theory should be conceived as a 
“form of reflection belonging to a historically effective reason which represents an 
emancipatory force.”50 
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This paper demonstrates how all those social and cultural praxes, political 
institutions, ideologies, or more generally those social structures that critical theorists try to 
question could be understood as relations of domination which, in different forms and to 
different degrees, attempt to limit, restrict, and elude the possibility of critique, or in extreme 
cases exclude it directly or, more commonly, indirectly. In other words, critical theory should 
address its social criticism primarily toward all those mechanisms of social life that prevent 
some members of society from participating effectively and voluntarily in the elaboration of 
the discourses of justification that uphold each social structure, and therefore prevent them 
from advancing critiques. Here we adopt the concept of justification in Forst’s 
understanding, according to which: 
it is at once a descriptive and a normative concept: it refers to the justifications 
of social relations actually offered in a given society and it refers to the 
relations that could be accepted as justified in the light of appropriate reasons. 
The sphere of critique intervenes as a third domain between them, as it 
were.51 
 
In this case the decisive criteria to evaluate social relations as justifiable are reciprocity 
and generality. This means that all those more or less institutionalized social relations and 
structures “must be justified by appeal to norms that can claim to hold in a reciprocal and 
general fashion.”52 Also, in this case, the criteria of reciprocity and generality are at the same 
time socially or historically reconstructed and they inscribe the principle of practical reason.53 
Another important aspect to pay attention to is Jaeggi’s54 concern about excessive neutrality 
regarding the different cultural forms that human life can take. Without entering into whether 
a manner such as Jaeggi’s suggests investigating rationally these forms of life is adequate or 
not, we should take this concern seriously here. In this regard we can assert and agree that 
cultural forms of life might, and could, be objects of investigation and critique, but it seems 
that the best way to proceed is to critique cultural forms of life when they subtend and 
involve a social relation of domination. This means that social relations should be understood 
not only as political relations but also as economic and cultural relations even when they are 
not strongly or narrowly institutionalized. In a certain respect, this interpretation would be 
consistent with what Jaeggi and Celikates hold to be the aim of critical theory, namely, “it 
                                                 
51 FORST, Justification and Critique, p. 7. 
52 FORST, Justification and Critique, p. 101. 
53 As Forst (Justification and Critique, p. 7) notes, “in order to avoid an instrumental conception of reason and 
given the impossibility of a substantialist conception of reason, ‘rational’ must be understood, following Jürgen 
Habermas, in the sense of ‘justified in discourse”. 
54 JAEGGI, Kritik von Lebensformen. 
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aims at the dissolution of social structural blocks of reflexive capability of the actors and of 
their ability to act.”55 
 
4. Conclusion: a critical theory of social justice 
 
As we have said, by considering relations of domination as the main object of 
investigation of critical theory we can draw a particular grammar of justice which is 
imminently relational or intersubjective. This brings about some important consequences 
concerning questions of distributive justice and power56 that here we can only describe briefly.  
First of all, we can highlight a certain idea of justice that is implicit in this 
interpretation and that can be defined as relational or intersubjective. This means that the 
requirements of justice come into play in situations where relations between the human 
beings involved are connected by political relations of rule or by social relations of 
cooperation in the production and distribution of goods. In order to avoid any 
misunderstanding, the meaning of cooperation must be understood in an extensive sense, 
that is, not simply as participation in the labor market, but a form of social cooperation 
insofar as participants share a social and political order. As Forst suggests: 
 
political and social justice is a matter of how a context of political rule and 
social cooperation is constituted; and the first question in this regard is how 
individuals are involved in political and social relations generally and in the 
production of material and immaterial goods in particular, so that a result is 
just only if it is produced under conditions that can be accepted by all, that is, 
conditions of non-domination.57 
 
According to this grammar of justice, the perspective of distributive justice has to 
shift its focus from what you have in terms of goods to how you are treated in relation to the 
system of production and distribution of goods. We should abandon the simply allocative-
redistributive paradigm in which a certain kind of system of production and distribution 
could be perceived as ‘natural’ and therefore we would need further redistribution. Instead, 
the first question of social justice should not be about the amount of goods each of us 
expects, but rather “how these goods come into the world in the first place and of who 
                                                 
55 JAEGGI, “Il punto di vista della teoria critica. Riflessioni sulla rivendicazione di oggettività della teoria 
critica”, p. 13, (my translation). 
56 Here power is understood in neutral terms. FORST, “Noumenal Power”. 
57 FORST, Justification and Critique, p. 26. 
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decides on their allocation and how this allocation is made.”58 This view might say something 
important about inequality, above all in those advanced capitalist societies that guarantee a 
certain basic level of goods to a large majority of the population but at the same time their 
institutions of production and distribution are set in such a way as to permit huge social and 
economic inequality insofar as the richest and a very small part of society controls not only 
the economy but also political life.59 
At this point in our discussion, the role of power emerges in all its own relevance. 
Some traditional theories of social justice tend to overlook or misunderstand the relevance 
and influence of power,60 but a critical theory of social justice should give priority to it. For a 
critical theory of social justice, a genealogical approach which focuses on justice indeed, 
searching for its historical and structural background is essential. The point is not how we 
should divide a cake, but rather how the cake was produced and, above all, who has the role 
of dividing it. In this case, the question of the distribution of power is fundamental in a 
theory of social justice. For this reason we should agree with Forst, who argues for a political 
turn within the theoretical discourse of justice, since no one can do a proper account of 
distributive justice without first addressing the political issue of power relations in a society: 
“persons should not primarily be recipients of justice, rather, they should be agents of justice, 
that is, autonomous agents who codetermine the structures of production and distribution 
that determine their lives.”61 
To conclude, if it is true that relations of domination are critical theory’s main object 
of investigation, as this article has suggested, so it implies that a critical theory of social justice 
should inquire primarily into the social relations of domination that concretely exist, 
independently of whether they are strictly political or economic, and they in turn need to be 
transformed into justifiable relations. This means that a critical theory of social justice should 
be transformative and emancipatory in itself. Moreover, it is necessary to stress how this 
interpretation of a critical theory of social justice is not an abstract, ideal theory, but rather 
that it is a reflexive and historical one, since the basic impulse of not to be dominated by 
others either directly or indirectly, or not to be dominated by arbitrary social and political 
rules insofar as they are non-reciprocally justifiable, was a historical claim of social justice 
and it is still a central force and motivation for driving social conflict. 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 FORST, Justification and Critique, p. 34-35. 
59 WERLE, “Estrutura básica como objeto da justiça: liberdades básicas e as bases sociais do autorrespeito”.  
60 See: PINZANI, “It’s the power, Stupid! On the Unmentioned Precondition of Social Justice”. 
61 FORST, Justification and Critique, p. 121. 
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